The Evolving Political Landscape of Israel: A 2024-2025 Assessment
1. Introduction
Israel operates as a parliamentary democracy, a system where the Prime Minister serves as the head of government within a dynamic multi-party framework.1 The political arena is largely dominated by Zionist parties, traditionally categorized into Labor Zionism, Revisionist Zionism, and Religious Zionism. Beyond these, the political spectrum also includes non-Zionist Orthodox religious parties, secular left-wing groups, and various Israeli Arab parties.1 The Knesset, Israel's unicameral legislature, consists of 120 members elected every four years through a system of party-list proportional representation.1 This electoral design, characterized by a relatively low threshold for entry, inherently encourages the proliferation of parties and necessitates the formation of coalition governments, making them a consistent and often unstable feature of Israeli politics.1
Historically, Israel's political scene was largely dominated by the left-leaning Mapai party (a predecessor to Labor) until the pivotal 1977 election. This election marked a significant shift to the right, with Menachem Begin's Likud bloc forming a coalition government.1 Since this realignment, coalition governments have been the norm, frequently experiencing instability and leading to early elections.1 Benjamin Netanyahu's current government, his third premiership, was sworn into office on December 29, 2022, following the 2022 legislative election. This government represents a predominantly right-wing and religious coalition, comprising Likud, Shas, United Torah Judaism, the Religious Zionist Party, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam.1 Netanyahu's return to power marked a significant political comeback, as he had been out of office since the anti-Netanyahu bloc secured a majority and formed a government without his Likud party in 2021.6
The consistent reliance on multi-party coalitions in Israel, due to its proportional representation system and low electoral threshold, creates a fundamental structural characteristic of chronic fragmentation. This means that even during periods of profound national crisis, the government's stability remains inherently fragile. Its survival is continuously susceptible to the demands, internal power struggles, and ideological shifts of its smaller coalition partners. Consequently, policy-making often becomes a convoluted process of complex compromises, potentially leading to less cohesive or more extreme policies designed to appease diverse ideological factions. The current Netanyahu III government, being a right-wing and religious coalition, serves as a prime example of this dynamic, where recent defections and reintegrations directly influence its legislative capacity and overall public perception of its effectiveness.6 The average lifespan of an Israeli government being approximately two years further underscores this chronic instability.1
2. The Netanyahu III Government: Structure, Composition, and Stability
2.1. Current Government Coalition
The current government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assumed power following the 2022 elections.1 As of mid-2025, the coalition's composition includes Likud, holding 32 seats and led by Benjamin Netanyahu; Shas, with 11 seats under Aryeh Deri; United Torah Judaism (UTJ), commanding 7 seats led by Yitzhak Goldknopf and Moshe Gafni; Mafdal–Religious Zionism, holding 7 seats under Bezalel Smotrich; Otzma Yehudit, with 6 seats led by Itamar Ben-Gvir; and Noam, holding 1 seat led by Avi Maoz.3 This alignment clearly reflects a predominantly right-wing and religious ideological foundation within the governing bloc.1
Table 1: Current Israeli Government Coalition (as of mid-2025)
2.2. Key Ministerial Portfolios and Changes
Benjamin Netanyahu holds the pivotal role of Prime Minister.7 Significant ministerial positions are held by Yariv Levin (Justice, also serving as Deputy Prime Minister), Bezalel Smotrich (Finance, with an additional portfolio in the Defense Ministry), Itamar Ben-Gvir (National Security), and Israel Katz (Foreign Affairs, having previously served as Defense Minister).8
The period has seen notable ministerial changes and temporary appointments, indicative of the government's dynamic internal politics. Gideon Sa'ar, for instance, assumed the role of Foreign Affairs Minister in November 2024.8 Haim Katz has frequently stepped into various acting ministerial roles, including Heritage, Development of the Negev and Galilee, and Housing and Construction.8 Yoav Gallant served as Minister of Defense until November 2024, when he was succeeded by Israel Katz.8 Itamar Ben-Gvir, leader of Otzma Yehudit, notably resigned from the government in January 2025 over a policy disagreement but was subsequently reintegrated into the coalition, highlighting the ongoing negotiations for stability.6 Amihai Eliyahu (Heritage) and Yitzhak Wasserlauf (Development of the Negev and Galilee) also experienced periods outside their ministerial roles.8
Table 2: Key Ministerial Portfolios and Incumbents (as of mid-2025)
2.3. Coalition Dynamics and Stability
The stability of the current government has been consistently precarious. Five members of the National Unity party, including prominent figures like Benny Gantz and Gideon Sa'ar, initially joined an emergency wartime government in October 2023 following the outbreak of the Gaza war.6 This initial formation of an emergency wartime government strongly suggested a classic "rally-around-the-flag" effect, where national crisis temporarily consolidates public and political support.12 However, this unity proved temporary: Gideon Sa'ar's New Hope faction resigned from the government on March 25, 2024, and subsequently merged into the Likud party on March 13, 2025.6 Benny Gantz and the remaining members of his National Unity party followed suit, leaving the government on June 9, 2024.6 Furthermore, Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, announced its withdrawal from the government on January 19, 2025, specifically citing dissatisfaction with a ceasefire agreement with Hamas, though the party was later reintegrated into the coalition.6
The relatively swift departures of key figures like Sa'ar and Gantz, and the temporary withdrawal of Otzma Yehudit, indicate that the initial wartime unity was superficial and short-lived. This reveals that fundamental political and ideological divisions re-emerged or intensified once the immediate, unifying threat perception receded, or specific policy disagreements, such as the Hamas ceasefire, came to the forefront. Prime Minister Netanyahu has reportedly worked diligently in recent weeks to stabilize his coalition, including the reintegration of figures like Gideon Sa'ar (through the merger of New Hope into Likud) and Itamar Ben-Gvir.11 His efforts underscore the constant, active struggle required to maintain a governing majority. The government's success in passing the 2025 budget law at the end of March 2025 was theoretically intended to ensure the coalition's stability until the end of the current Knesset's legal term, scheduled for October 2026.11 However, the underlying cohesion and long-term stability of the government are explicitly not considered an "irreversible reality".11
The highly publicized departure of Otzma Yehudit from the coalition over a ceasefire agreement, and its subsequent, seemingly necessary, reintegration, clearly illustrate the substantial leverage wielded by the far-right within the current government. This party's core ideology, which includes Kahanism and ultra-nationalism 6, combined with the presence of the Religious Zionist Party, which espouses far-right, ultra-nationalist, and Jewish supremacist ideologies 13, strongly suggests that Prime Minister Netanyahu must consistently accommodate their hardline stances to maintain his fragile parliamentary majority. The government's policy agenda, particularly concerning critical areas such as security, judicial reform, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is therefore likely to be heavily influenced, if not dictated, by its far-right and religious components. This influence could manifest in more aggressive or uncompromising stances on territorial issues, continued expansion of settlements, and persistent efforts to restrict the powers of the judiciary. Such policy directions carry significant risks, including increased international condemnation and isolation, as well as deepened domestic polarization and social unrest. The successful passing of the 2025 budget despite these internal tensions implies that significant concessions were made to these factions to secure their continued support, potentially at the expense of broader national consensus or long-term strategic interests.
2.4. Knesset Functions and Composition
The Knesset, as Israel's unicameral parliament with 120 members, serves several critical functions: it passes laws, supervises the work of the government, elects the President of Israel and the State Comptroller, and deliberates on state issues through its various committees.1 The current 25th Knesset notably has a relatively low number of Arab MKs (10), marking the lowest representation in two decades.3
The key opposition parties within the Knesset include Yesh Atid, holding 23 seats and led by Yair Lapid; National Unity, with 8 seats under Benny Gantz; Yisrael Beiteinu, commanding 6 seats led by Avigdor Lieberman; Ra'am, with 5 seats under Mansour Abbas; and Hadash–Ta'al, also with 5 seats led by Ayman Odeh.3
Recent developments indicate ongoing fluidity in the political landscape. The Labor and Meretz parties announced an agreement to merge into a new entity called The Democrats, with Yair Golan as its leader. However, a request in February 2025 to formally change the Knesset faction's name to The Democrats was denied.3 Concurrently, Gideon Sa'ar's New Hope faction officially merged into Likud in March 2025.6 Looking ahead, a new ultra-Orthodox party, "Mayim Chaim," has announced its intention to compete with Shas for votes in May 2025.6
Internal party dynamics are also evident, with leadership primaries being held or announced. Yesh Atid conducted its first leadership primary in March 2024, where Yair Lapid secured a narrow victory, signaling internal competition and efforts to solidify party leadership.6 Similarly, National Unity also announced its intention to hold leadership primaries in June 2025, indicating a focus on internal strength and readiness for potential future elections.6
The various party mergers and the announced emergence of new parties are not random occurrences but rather strategic adaptations by political actors. These developments suggest a deliberate and dynamic effort within the opposition to consolidate forces, potentially leading to a more unified and formidable front against the current government, contrasting with the historically fragmented nature of the Israeli opposition. While the current government maintains a right-wing majority, the opposition is actively restructuring and seeking greater cohesion. A more unified center-left bloc, if successfully formed, could present a significantly stronger electoral challenge in anticipated future elections, especially given the widespread public demand for snap elections.6 This internal restructuring within the opposition signals a strategic adaptation to the prevailing political climate and points to the potential for substantial shifts in the balance of power in the medium term, making the next election highly consequential.
3. Major Political Parties: Ideologies and Influence
3.1. Overview of Key Parties
The Israeli political landscape is characterized by a diverse array of parties, each with distinct ideologies and varying degrees of influence:
Likud: As the dominant right-wing party, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud's ideology is rooted in Zionism, conservatism, national conservatism, and right-wing populism.13 Historically, Likud has been a strong proponent of "Greater Israel" and Jewish settlement, though its stance has shown some moderation on Palestinian sovereignty, and it has engaged in peace negotiations at various times.10 Economically, the party generally supports free markets but also implements social welfare measures like a minimum wage.10 Since the 2010s, it has adopted a more populist approach, frequently criticizing perceived "elites" within the media and judiciary.10
Yesh Atid: A centrist party founded and led by Yair Lapid, Yesh Atid advocates for liberal Zionism, anti-clericalism, and secularism.13 Its platform prioritizes improving civil life, focusing on education, housing, health, and transportation, alongside government reform and promoting equality in education and military conscription (including for ultra-Orthodox and Arab sectors). The party aims to combat political corruption, foster economic growth, and pursue a two-state solution while safeguarding large Israeli settlement blocs.18 It also supports religious pluralism, civil marriage, and partial public transportation on Saturdays.18
Religious Zionist Party (Mafdal–RZ): This is a far-right, ultra-nationalist, Jewish supremacist, and religious Zionist political party, which includes elements of Kahanism in its ideology.6 Led by Bezalel Smotrich, the party is vehemently opposed to any territorial concessions to Palestinians or Syrians, advocates for the annexation of the West Bank, rejects same-sex marriage on religious grounds, and champions increased funding for Torah study.14 It has been characterized by external observers as "militantly anti-Arab".14
Shas & United Torah Judaism (UTJ): These are the primary ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel, with Shas representing Sephardic/Mizrahi Haredim and UTJ representing Ashkenazi Haredim. Both are rooted in religious conservatism and social conservatism.6 They are crucial and consistent coalition partners for Likud-led governments.1 Their political influence is particularly significant on issues pertaining to religion and state, notably the contentious Haredi military exemption.19
National Unity: A center to center-right Zionist party led by Benny Gantz.6 Its stated principles include belief in God, state sovereignty, national interest, democracy, social justice, and environmental awareness.21 Members of this party initially joined the emergency wartime government but later withdrew.6
Otzma Yehudit: A far-right, Kahanist, and ultra-nationalist party led by Itamar Ben-Gvir.6 It has proven to be a volatile, yet influential, coalition partner, demonstrating a willingness to challenge government decisions.6
Yisrael Beiteinu: A right-wing to far-right party led by Avigdor Lieberman, its platform is built on Revisionist Zionism, nationalism, and safeguarding the interests of Russian Jewish immigrants.6
Ra'am & Hadash–Ta'al: These represent the main Israeli Arab parties. Ra'am is characterized by Islamism and social conservatism.6 Hadash–Ta'al is a left-wing alliance focused on advocating for Israeli Arab interests, secularism, and progressivism, and supports a two-state solution.6
The Democrats: A newly formed center-left to left-wing party resulting from the merger of Labor and Meretz, led by Yair Golan. Its ideology embraces liberalism, social democracy, Zionism, a two-state solution, and progressivism.3
Table 3: Major Political Parties in the 25th Knesset: Ideologies and Positions
3.2. Intra-Party Developments
The political landscape is characterized by dynamic intra-party developments. The merger of the Labor and Meretz parties into "The Democrats" 3 and Gideon Sa'ar's New Hope faction merging into Likud 6 reflect ongoing processes of consolidation and strategic realignment within both the opposition and the government bloc.
A notable emerging development is the announcement of a new ultra-Orthodox party, "Mayim Chaim," which intends to directly compete with Shas for votes.6 This indicates potential fragmentation within the Haredi political sphere, which could have significant implications for future coalition dynamics and the balance of power among religious parties.
Furthermore, internal leadership primaries are shaping the future of key parties. Yesh Atid conducted its first leadership primary in March 2024, where Yair Lapid secured a narrow victory, signaling internal competition and efforts to solidify party leadership.6 Similarly, National Unity announced its intention to hold leadership primaries in June 2025, indicating a focus on internal strength and readiness for potential future elections.6
These various party mergers and the announced emergence of new parties are not random occurrences but rather strategic adaptations by political actors. These developments suggest a direct response to the perceived failures or limitations of the current government, the profound impact of ongoing conflicts, and the widespread public dissatisfaction.6 Parties are either consolidating their power to present a more unified and formidable alternative to the ruling bloc or, conversely, fragmenting to capture specific niche votes and enhance their bargaining power. This indicates a highly adaptive, competitive, and fluid political environment. The significant fluidity of party alliances, coupled with vigorous internal leadership contests, strongly suggests an anticipation of future elections. These ongoing developments could lead to a more clearly defined left-right ideological divide in the Israeli political landscape, or, conversely, result in even greater fragmentation, making future coalition formation even more challenging and unpredictable. The political system is demonstrably in a state of active recalibration, directly responding to the multifaceted crises currently facing the nation.
4. Domestic Challenges and Societal Pressures
4.1. The Judicial Overhaul
Benjamin Netanyahu's administration initiated extensive judicial reforms in 2023, designed to significantly diminish the Supreme Court's authority, increase the executive branch's influence over judicial appointments, and empower the Knesset to override court rulings with a simple majority.24 Advocates argue these reforms are essential to restore a proper balance between elected officials and appointed judges, asserting that the Supreme Court has overstepped its bounds.24 Conversely, opponents vehemently warn that these changes pose a severe threat to democratic checks and balances, compromise judicial independence, and erode protections for minority rights.24
The "battle over Israel's legal system" notably resumed in March 2025, with Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Gideon Sa'ar leading a renewed push to alter the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee.25 The current proposal aims to fundamentally shift the committee's balance from a professionally oriented body to one that is politically oriented, thereby granting the ruling coalition significantly more control over judicial appointments.25 A significant constitutional crisis has emerged concerning the appointment of a new Supreme Court president. Minister Levin has openly opposed the long-standing seniority rule, resulting in a 15-month vacancy in the presidency and a notable boycott of the new president's swearing-in ceremony by government ministers.25 Further measures that could erode the system of checks and balances include calls by government ministers to dismiss the attorney general, decisions to limit the term of service for governmental legal advisers, and Minister Levin's refusal to appoint a judicial complaints ombudsman.25
The proposed judicial reforms, particularly those targeting the Judicial Selection Committee and granting the Knesset the power to override Supreme Court decisions, represent a direct and profound threat to the independence of the judiciary, which is a foundational pillar of any democratic system. The ongoing constitutional crisis, specifically concerning the Supreme Court presidency, and the government's unprecedented refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the elected president, signify a direct challenge to the rule of law itself. The explicit comparison drawn in the research to Poland's experience with democratic decline serves as a stark warning.24 This is far more than a mere policy debate; it is a fundamental struggle over the very character of Israel's democratic governance. If these reforms are fully implemented, they carry the significant risk of centralizing power within the executive branch, severely undermining governmental accountability, and weakening essential protections for minority rights. This trajectory could potentially lead Israel towards a more authoritarian state. This internal conflict is a primary source of profound instability and widespread public discontent, continuing to fester even amidst the nation's external wars.
The research explicitly notes that the judicial overhaul "resumed" precisely as the war in the Middle East was "receding".25 Crucially, the text states that this renewed push "takes advantage of the public's exhaustion from 16 months of armed conflict, making concerns about the judicial reform less visible".25 This phrasing strongly suggests a calculated and opportunistic move by the government to advance highly controversial domestic policies at a time when public attention is diverted or fatigued by prolonged external crises. While this tactic might enable the ruling coalition to further entrench its power and reshape Israel's institutional framework with reduced public scrutiny and resistance, it simultaneously risks deepening internal societal divisions. This could lead to renewed and intensified domestic unrest once the immediate external pressures eventually ease, creating a volatile post-conflict environment.
4.2. Economic Landscape and Cost of Living
Israeli households are facing a significant surge in living costs in 2025. The VAT increased from 17% to 18% on January 1st, electricity rates rose by 3.8%, water costs climbed by 3.4%, and municipal property tax (arnona) saw its steepest increase in 17 years, jumping by 5.29%.11 Public transportation users also face an additional 2 NIS per ride.11 Public sector employees are particularly affected, facing a 2.3% salary reduction and the loss of one day of their convalescence pay for the second consecutive year.11 Food costs are also expected to rise, despite a decline in international commodity prices, with major manufacturers announcing increases ranging from 3% to 18% on various products.11
The nation's fiscal deficit has risen to 4.7% in 2025 and is projected to exceed 5% if the war expands further.11 The 2025 state budget increased significantly to approximately NIS 755.9 billion ($207 billion), with military spending reaching a historic high of NIS 109.8 billion, representing about 6.5% of GDP—the second highest percentage globally.11 The OECD has issued warnings that Israel's high cost of living is a significant factor spurring social tensions. The organization recommends addressing socioeconomic gaps by removing government subsidies for yeshiva students, reducing bureaucratic red tape, and boosting competitiveness and productivity across the economy beyond the tech sector.11 Furthermore, the OECD highlighted that low labor-force participation among ultra-Orthodox men and Arab women is significantly hindering the country's overall economic growth potential.11
The economic consequences of the prolonged conflicts are not merely financial burdens but also potent drivers of social tension and internal friction. The massive increase in military spending due to the ongoing conflicts directly contributes to a rising fiscal deficit and necessitates higher taxes and increased costs for citizens. The OECD's pointed recommendations to address socioeconomic gaps by targeting subsidies for yeshiva students and improving labor participation among ultra-Orthodox and Arab women highlight that the economic strain is not uniformly distributed. Instead, it disproportionately affects certain segments of the population and exposes existing, deep-seated societal cleavages. The long-standing Haredi exemption from military service is directly linked to their lower workforce participation and greater dependence on government subsidies, which in turn generates significant resentment among the secular majority who bear the brunt of military service and taxation.19 This growing resentment and perceived inequality have the potential to fuel further anti-government sentiment and contribute to broader societal unrest and instability.
4.3. Social Cohesion and Public Trust
Public trust in Israeli government institutions is at critically low levels as of March 2025. Only 17% of the public expresses trust in the government, and a mere 11% trust the Knesset.22 This represents a consistent downward trend in recent months.22 In stark contrast, the Supreme Court enjoys a significantly higher public trust rating of 44%, and the President commands 42% trust.22 The judicial system as a whole, along with the Attorney General (43%), maintains relatively higher levels of public confidence compared to other government institutions.22
Table 4: Public Trust in Israeli Institutions (March 2025)
The initial "rally-around-the-flag" effect observed at the outbreak of the Gaza war, which temporarily bolstered public support for the military campaign and trust in Prime Minister Netanyahu's leadership, has significantly waned.12 Recent polls clearly indicate a growing dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the ongoing conflict.12 The Haredi military exemption continues to be a central and deeply divisive issue within Israeli society.19 While a segment of the Haredi community sincerely believes that Torah study is paramount for Israel's security and survival, others argue that their exemption contributes to high unemployment rates within their community and fosters alienation from broader secular Israeli society.19 The Israeli Supreme Court has previously ruled this exemption unlawful, demanding legislative action from the Knesset, which has yet to successfully provide a lasting solution.19
The overwhelming public opinion, with over 75% believing Netanyahu should resign, and the strong majority (64%) demanding snap elections 6, directly correlates with the "perceived failure of leadership" during the Gaza war.28 The consistent, large-scale, and often confrontational anti-government and hostage deal protests throughout 2024-2025 29 are a tangible and powerful manifestation of this deep public dissatisfaction. These protests represent a clear demand for accountability from the government. The ongoing war, contrary to potentially unifying the nation behind its leadership, has instead become a profound catalyst for significant anti-government sentiment and internal political pressure. This widespread public demand for change, combined with the government's already low trust ratings, creates an exceptionally volatile environment. This pressure could potentially force early elections, irrespective of the government's theoretical stability until the scheduled 2026 date, indicating a direct link between public opinion and political trajectory.
4.4. Domestic Impact of the Gaza War
The protracted Gaza war has led to a significant increase in public disapproval of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government, primarily due to a widespread perception of leadership failure in managing the conflict. Polls indicate that over 75% of Israelis believe Netanyahu should resign.6 Concurrently, there are widespread calls for snap elections to be held once the war concludes, with 64% of Israelis supporting this demand.6
Anti-government and hostage deal protests have been a consistent and prominent feature of the Israeli domestic scene throughout 2024 and into 2025. Some of these demonstrations have attracted over 100,000 participants.29 These protests have, at times, escalated into clashes with police, led to significant road blockages, and unfortunately, included incidents of violence against protesters.29
The conflict has resulted in extensive destruction within Gaza, with reports indicating over 44,000 fatalities and 104,000 wounded by late November 2024.30 Nearly the entire Palestinian population in Gaza has been forcibly displaced, facing severe food insecurity or outright famine.30 Critical infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and communication networks, has been extensively damaged or completely destroyed.28 In the West Bank, Israeli forces killed 719 Palestinians between October 2023 and October 2024, a number far exceeding any other year since the UN began systematically recording fatalities in 2005.30
5. International Relations and Regional Conflicts
5.1. The Israel-Iran Conflict (June 2025)
A direct military conflict between Israel and Iran erupted on June 13, 2025, characterized by a three-day exchange of missile attacks.9 Israel initiated airstrikes targeting Iran's nuclear and military sites, including top generals and nuclear scientists.9 In retaliation, Iran fired over 270 missiles, causing damage and casualties within Israel.9 Casualties reported include at least 657 people (including 263 civilians) killed and over 2,000 wounded in Iran.9 In Israel, 24 people were killed and hundreds wounded.9
Specific targets: Israeli strikes hit Iranian oil refineries, the intelligence chief of the Revolutionary Guard, the Foreign Ministry, and key nuclear facilities such as Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak.9 Iran's retaliatory strikes impacted residential suburbs, caused destruction in cities like Bat Yam and Tamra, and damaged an oil refinery in Haifa.9 International responses: The UN Secretary-General called for de-escalation, warning of broader regional consequences.34 The United States significantly stepped up efforts to evacuate its citizens from Israel and actively participated in the air campaign against Iranian nuclear sites, utilizing "bunker-buster" bombs.9 President Trump reportedly had a "very warm conversation" with Netanyahu, expressing strong support.35 Iran's Foreign Minister stated that diplomacy was no longer an option following the US strikes.37
The transition from a long-standing proxy conflict to direct military exchanges between sovereign states, Israel and Iran, represents a critical and highly dangerous escalation in Middle East dynamics. The deliberate targeting of nuclear facilities and the deployment of advanced weaponry, such as "bunker-buster" bombs, signify a heightened level of strategic confrontation. International warnings regarding the potential for "limitless war" and the risk of "engulfing the region" underscore the severe and far-reaching implications of this direct conflict.34 This direct military confrontation fundamentally reshapes the regional security landscape. It dramatically increases the risk of a broader regional war, potentially drawing in other state and non-state actors, and leading to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences for global energy markets and international stability. Furthermore, it compels key international actors, particularly the United States and European nations, to urgently re-evaluate their diplomatic and security strategies in the Middle East, as the conflict's scope and intensity have escalated beyond previous thresholds.
Despite urgent international calls for de-escalation from various world leaders 9, the United States actively joined Israel's air campaign against Iran, notably employing "bunker-buster" bombs.9 President Trump's "very warm conversation" with Netanyahu 35 and his strong, supportive rhetoric against Iran 32 demonstrate a robust, almost unconditional, alignment between the two countries. This strong backing persists even as other international actors advocate for restraint and diplomatic solutions. This unwavering US support provides Israel with significant military and diplomatic backing to pursue its strategic objectives against Iran, potentially emboldening its actions and reducing its incentive to de-escalate. However, this deep alignment also carries the inherent risk of drawing the United States deeper into a volatile regional conflict, potentially straining its relations with other international allies who prioritize diplomacy and de-escalation. This dynamic suggests that the effectiveness of broader international pressure on Israel might be significantly limited as long as it retains such strong and explicit US backing.
5.2. Relations with the United States
Amidst escalating regional tensions and fears of Iranian retaliation, the United States has intensified efforts to evacuate its citizens from Israel.35 The US Embassy in Jerusalem issued explicit security alerts, advising American citizens and government employees to shelter in place.36 The US continues to provide substantial security assistance to Israel, with an unprecedented $17.9 billion in aid and approval of over 100 arms sales.30 This assistance is provided even as the US has withheld funding to UNRWA, the primary humanitarian agency for Palestinians.30 Following the US strikes on Iran, President Trump reportedly engaged in a "very warm conversation" with Prime Minister Netanyahu, with Trump publicly declaring Netanyahu a "friend of Israel like no one before him".35
Despite the profound escalation of conflict in the region, the severe humanitarian concerns in Gaza 28, and the increasing international legal scrutiny (ICC arrest warrants) 30, the United States' actions consistently underscore a deep and unwavering strategic alliance with Israel. This is evident through the stepped-up evacuation efforts for US citizens, the issuance of security alerts, direct military involvement in the Iran conflict, continued arms sales, and explicit presidential support.9 The US-Israel relationship remains an absolutely critical pillar of Israel's foreign policy and national security doctrine. This robust alliance provides Israel with significant military and diplomatic leverage on the global stage. However, it also inherently implicates the US in the complexities and consequences of regional conflicts, and potentially constrains the US's ability to exert meaningful pressure on Israel for de-escalation, adherence to international humanitarian law, or a more flexible approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
5.3. Relations with Arab States (Abraham Accords)
The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, formally normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. These agreements were primarily driven by the potential for mutual economic benefits and shared security cooperation against common threats, particularly Iran.11 The accords have successfully fostered significant economic and technological ties, notably including a free trade agreement between the UAE and Israel signed in 2023.40 A striking demonstration of this cooperation was seen in April 2024, when Arab partners reportedly assisted in shooting down Iranian drones and missiles launched against Israel, indicating a willingness to take previously unthinkable steps to prevent regional military escalation.39
However, public opinion in Abraham Accords countries largely remains opposed to deepening relations with Israel. A 2024 poll by the Arab Center in Washington, DC, revealed that majorities in Bahrain and the UAE hold negative views of Israel.40 Governments in these signatory states navigate a delicate balance, publicly condemning Israeli actions (especially in the aftermath of October 7) to placate domestic opposition, while simultaneously allowing security and defense partnerships to quietly flourish.40 Formal normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia is widely considered unlikely in the immediate term, as Saudi officials have stressed the necessity of not only an end to the Gaza war but also a credible path towards a Palestinian state.39
The behavior of the Abraham Accords states reveals a sophisticated and pragmatic diplomatic strategy. While their governments issue public condemnations of Israeli actions, particularly in the context of the post-October 7 Gaza war, to manage domestic public opinion, they are simultaneously deepening economic and security ties with Israel. The concrete action of Arab partners helping to intercept Iranian drones is a powerful, tangible illustration of this covert cooperation, driven by shared strategic security interests, primarily against Iran. The Abraham Accords fundamentally represent a strategic realignment in the Middle East, driven more by shared threat perceptions and economic opportunities than by a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This dual-track approach by Arab states allows for the continuation of pragmatic cooperation with Israel while simultaneously enabling them to maintain public support for the Palestinian cause. This highlights the enduring challenge posed by the Palestinian issue, which remains a significant barrier to full and overt regional integration and normalization.
5.4. Relations with Europe
European nations are increasingly focused on the escalating Israel-Iran conflict, a development that threatens to overshadow existing concerns regarding Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank.41 The European Union has largely favored dialogue over imposing sanctions in its engagement with Israel concerning the occupation of the West Bank, despite consistently condemning settlement expansion and the eviction of Bedouin communities.41 In February 2025, the EU held an Association Council meeting with Israel, primarily to review bilateral ties and reiterate calls for a ceasefire in Gaza and unhindered humanitarian access.41 While the EU is reviewing its Association Agreement and considering measures to prevent European companies from operating in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, its actions have so far been limited to imposing sanctions on a handful of individuals and entities within the settler movement, with little discernible effect.41 Significant concern persists over Israel's "E1" plan to construct housing units for Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem, which the EU considers a "redline".41 Notably, individual European countries, including the Netherlands, Canada, and the UK, have taken steps to suspend some arms transfers or licenses to Israel. This decision was made due to a clear risk that these arms could be used in serious violations of international law.30
European responses to Israel are characterized by a pronounced tension: on one hand, there is condemnation of Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories, while on the other, there is a growing imperative to support Israel in its escalating conflict with Iran. While some individual European nations have taken concrete steps like suspending arms transfers, the European Union as a collective bloc has largely relied on a policy of "dialogue over sanctions." This approach has demonstrably proven ineffective in significantly restraining Israeli settlement expansion or other actions in the West Bank. The current focus on the Iran conflict further risks diverting European attention and political will away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, potentially diluting any existing pressure. Europe's capacity to exert meaningful influence over Israeli policy, particularly concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, appears to be both limited and fragmented. The strategic prioritization of regional stability in the face of the direct conflict with Iran might lead to a de-emphasis on human rights and international law concerns related to the Palestinian territories. This could, in turn, weaken Europe's moral standing and diminish its potential to act as a significant and effective diplomatic force for a two-state solution or for upholding international law in the region.
5.5. International Legal Scrutiny
In 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. These warrants cited allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza.30 Concurrently, warrants were also requested for several Hamas leaders.30 UN experts have issued strong warnings, stating that continued material or political support for Israel, particularly through arms transfers, risks complicity in genocide and other serious international crimes.38
The issuance of ICC arrest warrants against sitting Israeli leaders represents a significant escalation beyond mere diplomatic condemnation, moving towards direct legal accountability. This development, coupled with explicit warnings from UN experts about the potential for states providing support to be complicit in war crimes, indicates a growing and increasingly assertive international legal framework challenging Israel's actions, even if major allies like the United States continue to provide robust support. While the immediate practical impact of ICC warrants on Israeli policy might be limited due to strong political backing from key allies, they profoundly raise the personal and political stakes for Israeli leaders. Such legal actions could lead to increased international isolation, potential travel restrictions for indicted officials, and significant reputational damage for the state of Israel. This intensifying legal pressure also has the potential to fuel domestic debate and opposition to the government's policies, particularly from segments of Israeli society concerned about the nation's international standing and adherence to international law.
6. Outlook and Future Scenarios
The current government's stability remains highly fragile, marked by recent coalition departures and the continuous need for complex reintegration efforts.6 Widespread public calls for Prime Minister Netanyahu's resignation and demands for snap elections 6 indicate a high potential for early elections well before the legally scheduled date of October 2026.6 The ongoing judicial overhaul 24 and its associated constitutional crisis further destabilize the political environment. Future coalition formation will undoubtedly remain complex, primarily due to Israel's fragmented party system and deep, often irreconcilable, ideological divides.1 The emergence of new parties and strategic realignments within the opposition 6 suggest a dynamic and unpredictable pre-election political landscape.
The direct Israel-Iran conflict has escalated significantly 9, indicating a high likelihood of continued regional tension and a persistent risk of further escalation. The Gaza war continues to exact a severe humanitarian toll 28, and its ultimate resolution remains highly uncertain, heavily influenced by internal Israeli political dynamics and evolving international pressure. Domestically, the judicial overhaul is projected to remain a major flashpoint, potentially deepening the existing constitutional crisis and internal societal divisions.25
The judicial overhaul, if fully implemented as proposed, poses a significant long-term threat to Israel's democratic checks and balances, potentially undermining the separation of powers.24 The ongoing conflicts and increasing international legal scrutiny, including ICC warrants and UN warnings 30, risk severely damaging Israel's international standing and could lead to increased isolation, despite the robust support from the United States. Furthermore, the compounding economic strain and persistent social divisions, such as the Haredi military exemption debate and rising cost of living 11, could lead to sustained internal unrest and fundamental challenges to the nation's social cohesion. The various crises confronting Israel—governmental instability, the contentious judicial overhaul, significant economic strain, deep social divisions, the ongoing Gaza war, and the direct military conflict with Iran—are deeply intertwined. This interconnectedness creates a complex and volatile political environment, where developments in one area inevitably influence and exacerbate challenges in others, leading to compounding instability across the nation.
Conclusions
The political situation in Israel in mid-2025 is defined by a confluence of profound internal and external pressures, creating an environment of exceptional volatility and uncertainty. The current Netanyahu III government, a coalition rooted in right-wing and religious ideologies, maintains a precarious hold on power, constantly navigating internal dissent and the demands of its far-right partners. This inherent fragility is exacerbated by the temporary nature of wartime unity, which has given way to renewed political infighting and a shifting opposition landscape actively seeking to consolidate its strength.
Domestically, the nation grapples with a multi-faceted crisis. The judicial overhaul, actively pursued by the government, represents a fundamental challenge to Israel's democratic institutions, threatening judicial independence and accountability. This internal ideological battle is compounded by severe economic strains, including a rising cost of living and a ballooning fiscal deficit driven by unprecedented military spending. These economic burdens disproportionately affect segments of the population and exacerbate pre-existing social divisions, particularly concerning the contentious Haredi military exemption. Public trust in the government and Knesset has plummeted to historic lows, fueling widespread anti-government protests and strong calls for snap elections, indicating a deep public dissatisfaction and a demand for leadership accountability. The ongoing Gaza war continues to exact a devastating humanitarian toll and remains a central driver of domestic discontent.
Internationally, Israel faces escalating regional conflicts, most notably the direct military confrontation with Iran. This shift from proxy warfare to direct state-on-state engagement fundamentally reshapes the regional security landscape, carrying significant risks of broader destabilization. While Israel benefits from unwavering strategic alignment and substantial military support from the United States, this support also implicates the US in the regional complexities and may limit broader international de-escalation efforts. Relations with Abraham Accords states demonstrate a dual-track diplomacy, balancing public condemnation of Israeli actions with covert strategic cooperation driven by shared security interests. European nations, while expressing concerns over human rights and international law in the Palestinian territories, appear to have limited leverage, with their focus increasingly diverted by the escalating conflict with Iran. Furthermore, Israel faces intensifying international legal scrutiny, with ICC arrest warrants against its leaders raising the stakes for its international standing and potentially leading to increased isolation.
In sum, Israel's political trajectory is profoundly shaped by the interconnectedness of these crises. The government's efforts to maintain stability and pursue its agenda are continuously challenged by a highly fragmented domestic political system, deep societal cleavages, and a volatile regional security environment. The current period represents a critical juncture, with the potential for significant shifts in its democratic governance, internal cohesion, and international standing in the years to come.
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